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STORIES THAT SWIM UPSTREAM: UNCOVERING
THE INFLUENCE OF STEREOTYPES AND
STOCK STORIES IN FOURTH AMENDMENT
REASONABLE SUSPICION ANALYSIS
SHERRI LEE KEENE
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the
coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can
breathe in this atmosphere. . . . Until their voices matter too, our
justice system will continue to be anything but.1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been much discussion in the media about aggressive policing of African Americans and resulting harms.2 Increased news
reporting about police shootings of unarmed African-American males has
sparked broader conversations about targeted policing.3 Government reports
have followed, confirming that African Americans in many communities are
disproportionately stopped by police and subject to disparate treatment.4
© 2017 Sherri Lee Keene.
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1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2. See Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We
All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2015) (describing extensive news coverage
of police officer killings of African-American men and boys).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to ‘Black Lives Matter’, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/02/27/fromtrayvon-martin-to-black-lives-matter/; Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was
Pulled Over 49 Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/before-philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trail-ofminor-traffic-stops.html.
4. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016),
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Yet, in the midst of intense public discussion and debate, the Supreme
Court recently declined to suppress evidence seized following an unlawful
stop, thus further expanding the tools available to law enforcement. In Utah
v. Strieff,5 the Court considered whether evidence discovered during a police
officer’s unlawful stop of a private citizen must be suppressed and excluded
from trial when the officer learned during the stop that the citizen was subject
to a valid warrant for a traffic violation.6 In allowing the seized evidence to
be used at trial, the Supreme Court seemed to turn a deaf ear to expressed
concerns about broad police discretion.7
While the majority’s decision in Strieff was remarkable for its incongruence with conversations outside the courtroom, it was Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent that attracted attention.8 Justice Sotomayor challenged many of the
assumptions underlying the majority’s decision, including the majority’s
finding that the police officer’s conduct in that case was “isolated” and not
“part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”9 Justice Sotomayor
also spoke bluntly about what the Court’s decision meant for private citizens.10 But what was most notable about Justice Sotomayor’s dissent was
the part that she wrote “only for [her]self”11 about the severe consequences
of unlawful stops and their disproportionate impact on people of color.12 Cit-

https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download; see also Wesley Lowery, Study Finds Police
Shoot Unarmed Black Men at Disproportionate Rates, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/national/study-finds-police-fatally-shoot-unarmedblack-men-at-disproportionate-rates/2016/04/06/e494563e-fa74-11e5-80e4c381214de1a3_story.html.
5. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).
6. Id. at 2060.
7. See id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Id.; see Robert Barnes, Sotomayor’s Fierce Dissent Slams High Court’s Ruling on Evidence from Illegal Stops, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-5-3-that-mistakes-by-officer-dont-undermine-conviction/2016/06/20/f1f7d0d2-36f9-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html;
Matt
Ford,
Justice
Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/.
9. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (challenging the majority’s conclusion, Justice Sotomayor
pointed to studies and statistics about the prevalence with which warrants are issued and how warrants have been used by police across the country to stop private citizens without cause).
10. Id. at 2064 (“This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.”).
11. Id. at 2069 (“Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional experiences, I would
add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested
by the name.”).
12. Id. at 2070 (stating that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of
this type of scrutiny”).
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ing to books by renowned African-American authors, Justice Sotomayor addressed the issue of race in police stops from a space beyond the law—one
not carved out by Fourth Amendment legal standards.13
In contrast to the majority, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent addressed concerns about policing practices that have dominated national news in recent
years, but have appeared to have little impact in individual cases and have
effected no meaningful changes in the law.14 Indeed, while protests following police killings of African Americans continue to erupt like wild fire in
communities across the country, explicit discussions about the relationship
between a citizen’s race and the police officer’s decision to conduct a stop
continue to seem out of place in many criminal courtrooms.15 In many jurisdictions, the overrepresentation of African Americans as criminal defendants
alone seems a good conversation starter. Nevertheless, despite the fact that
criminal courtrooms continue to be filled with disproportionately high numbers of black and brown defendants,16 concerns about the role of race in police stops continue largely to go unspoken and unaddressed.17
While many legal outsiders may wonder how increasing public outcries
of racial inequality seem to have so little impact in the criminal justice system, those familiar with the law should have a fairly good idea. For many

13. Id. (citing W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903); JAMES BALDWIN, THE
FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015)).
14. Id. at 2068–69.
15. See Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245, 2265
(2014) (discussing ways for defense counsel to “inject issues concerning race discrimination” into
courtroom conversation “which, for too many reasons to recount . . . manages to bypass race bias
while being steeped in it”).
16. Trends in U.S. Corrections, SENTENCING PROJECT 1, 5, http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections/ (last updated March 2017) (stating that more than
60% of those incarcerated are persons of color); see also Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know
About the Criminal Justice System and People of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 28, 2015,
12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/news/2015/05/28/113436/8facts-you-should-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-people-of-color/ (stating that “40
percent of those who are incarcerated are black” despite “being only 13 percent of the overall U.S.
population”).
17. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1, 9 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf (citing statistics showing that people of color were
nearly three times more likely to be searched during a stop than whites); see also Racial Disparities
in Sentencing: Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United States Before the
Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., 153rd Session, at 8 (Oct. 27, 2014) (written testimony by Am. Civil
Liberties Union) (providing that “of the 4.4 million pedestrian stops made by the New York City
Police Department from January 2004 through June 2012, 83 percent of the people stopped were
African-American or Latino and only 10 percent were white”); Sharad Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANN.
APPLIED STAT. 365, 380 (2016) (discussing research showing that while controlling for a number
of variables, relative to similarly situated whites, blacks stopped for possible weapon possession are
less likely to actually possess a weapon: 2.5% of blacks compared to 3.8% of whites).
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years, courts have addressed police stops and searches while ignoring matters
of race, often making a seemingly conscious choice not even to mention the
defendant’s race in their opinions despite police officer testimony that references the defendant’s racial identity.18 Indeed, in 1996, the Supreme Court,
in Whren v. United States,19 moved courts beyond what was then merely a
practice of discussing police stops in race-neutral terms; there, the Court held
that discussions of racial motivation were not relevant to Fourth Amendment
analysis.20 In Whren, the Court made clear that the focus of courts’ Fourth
Amendment analysis is whether a stop can be justified on objective grounds,
not a police officer’s actual motivations.21
In the twenty years since Whren was decided, however, it has become
increasingly clear that simply ignoring the role of race in police stops does
not diminish its impact. Of course, the Court’s focus on the validity of individual stops has done little to address the concern that racial minorities as a
group are targeted more often for police stops. Indeed, the legal standard
asserted in Whren allows courts to validate police stops even where the factual basis put forth by a police officer is merely a pretext for racial profiling.22
But, the Court’s decision also fails to account for the hidden effects of racial
bias in police officer decisionmaking. In Whren, the Court’s reasoning rests
on a faulty assumption that police officers’ perceptions and judgments about
a citizen’s behavior, are not vulnerable themselves to the influence of race.23

18. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962–71 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court’s seemingly “conscious choice”
to strip away the racial dimensions of Terry v. Ohio by removing all references to the race of the
individuals involved).
19. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
20. Id. at 813 (holding that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis” and reasoning that prior cases “foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved”).
21. Id. (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by
the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” (quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978))).
22. Id.
23. See Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 886 (2015)
(first citing Thompson, supra note 18, at 987–91; and then citing Andrew D. Leipold, Objective
Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 559, 566–68 (1998)) (describing scholarship criticizing the Whren decision on various grounds including that the decision overlooks the problem of police perjury and ignores the
psychological realities of police behavior).
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Since the time that Whren was decided, implicit bias has become the
subject of increasing study.24 A mounting body of research by social scientists now shows that racial bias can be unconscious and impact an individual’s thinking at a fundamental level.25 Negative racial stereotypes associating African-American men with crime have resulted in deeply engrained and
widespread bias against members of this group.26 Even individuals who actively reject negative racial stereotypes can nonetheless be influenced by biases of which they are not even aware.27 Thus, implicit racial bias can influence decisionmaking, even where decisionmakers think they are being fair
and unbiased.28 Unsurprisingly, police officers are not immune, and perhaps,
given the nature of their work, are even more prone to be influenced.29
Though implicit bias is now better understood, courts have not yet
adapted to address the many concerns that recent studies have raised.30 Some
organizations have made efforts to learn from available research and to strate-

24. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128–32
(2012) (describing the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and social scientists’ studies of implicit bias).
25. See Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1132 (describing implicit biases as “attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible through introspection.”); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive
Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 271 (2012) (describing
implicit bias as “a psychological process in which a person’s non-conscious racial beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudices) affect her or his behaviors, perceptions and judgments in ways that
she or he are largely unaware of and typically, unable to control”); see also CHERYL STAATS ET AL.,
KIRWAN INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW (2016), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/implicit-bias-2016.pdf (annual compilation of research
on implicit bias in various subject areas).
26. Richardson, supra note 25, at 281 (discussing psychological studies by Jennifer Eberhardt
demonstrating that “when thinking about crime, civilians and officers alike non-consciously think
about blacks”); see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 883 (2004) (“Not only are Blacks thought of as
criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black.”); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006) (finding
that by “conservative estimate,” seventy-five percent of whites and fifty percent of blacks show
anti-Black bias).
27. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1128–29 (“[A] positive attitude does not foreclose negative
stereotypes and vice versa.”); Richardson, supra note 25, at 271–72 (“[I]mplicit biases can have
behavioral effects even when they conflict with an individual’s consciously and genuinely held
thoughts and feelings.”).
28. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1129 (stating that the impact of implicit attitudes and stereotypes on an individual’s decisionmaking and behaviors is not dependent on that individual’s awareness that he or she possesses such biases).
29. Richardson, supra note 25, at 277, 278–79 (discussing how implicit bias can impact the
judgments of police officers who engage in “proactive policing”).
30. See Kang et al., supra at note 24 (discussing growing scientific literature on implicit bias
and addressing the fundamental question of what should be done about implicit bias in the courtroom).
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gize how best to address widespread unconscious racial bias in the courtroom.31 While there has been significant focus on how courts can reduce bias
in areas such as juror decisionmaking, however, less has been said about how
courts might address implicit biases that are more firmly rooted in laws and
procedures.32 For example, while much more is known about implicit bias
since the Supreme Court made its decision in Whren, courts are still bound
to follow the legal standard set forth in that case—a legal standard that assumes that police officers’ perceptions and judgments about what they observe are not tainted by racial bias.
This Essay challenges courts to acknowledge and address racial bias in
the courtroom at a more fundamental level. It discusses the limitations of
judicial review, which fails to appreciate the potential impact of implicit racial bias on a police officer’s assessment of a citizen’s behavior. Specifically,
it focuses on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
analysis and explains how the potential for biased decisionmaking is worsened in a legal system where race is deemed legally irrelevant, and as a result
not meaningfully considered. Moreover, this Essay discusses the specific
challenge of cognitive shortcuts that can mask implicit racial bias, limiting a
court’s ability to recognize its potential influence and thus engage in a robust
review of police officers’ actions.
Part I discusses how implicit bias can impact an individual’s judgment
and subsequent decisionmaking. This Part will focus on implicit racial bias,
and address the impact that embedded knowledge structures can have on how
individuals process information. Part II discusses Fourth Amendment standards for assessing the lawfulness of police stops and how these standards fail
to acknowledge the influence of implicit racial bias. The reasonable suspicion test is meant to balance the need for police intrusion against the constitutional infringement caused by the intrusion on private citizens. This Part
will illustrate the role that implicit bias can play when courts engage in judicial review of police officers’ decisionmaking in circumstances that can trigger racially biased thinking, but in which the influence of racial bias is ignored. Ignoring the potential influence of race can skew the conversation in
the courtroom and lead to an overestimation of the need for police intrusion.
Specifically, this Part will discuss, first, how the “objective facts” test articulated in Terry v Ohio33 fails to account for the impact of implicit racial bias
on police officers’ perceptions of citizens’ ambiguous behaviors. Second,

31. See STAATS ET AL., supra note 25; PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
CTS., HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx.
32. See STAATS ET AL., supra note 25, at 19–27.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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this Part will discuss why legal standards encouraging courts’ reliance on
police officers’ experiences relieves courts of the need to demand explanations for police officers’ assumptions that may in fact be the result, not of
sound reason, but rather of racial bias. Third, this Part discusses how courts’
failure to acknowledge the role that race can play in police officers’ decisionmaking leads to court findings of reasonable suspicion that appear to be
based less on objective facts and more on racial stereotypes.
I. HOW IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS CAN IMPACT PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, AND
DECISIONMAKING
In 2013, the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for writ of
certiorari in the case of Calhoun v. United States.34 Defendant Calhoun, an
African-American man, had been convicted in Texas federal court for participation in a drug conspiracy.35 The primary issue at trial was whether Calhoun knew that the friend and associates he had accompanied on a road trip
were going to engage in a drug transaction, or whether, as Calhoun argued,
he was merely present in the car and did not know of the plan to purchase
drugs.36 Among the evidence put forth to prove Calhoun’s knowledge was
the testimony of two alleged co-conspirators who pleaded guilty, testimony
of law enforcement officers who purported that they had discussed drugs with
Calhoun, and Calhoun’s possession of a gun.37 In his defense, Calhoun explained that he always carried a concealed weapon and was licensed to do
so.38 As Justice Sotomayor put it, “[i]t was up to the jurors to decide whom
they believed.”39
Justice Sonia Sotomayor drew notice in that case when she wrote a statement regarding a “racially charged remark” made by the prosecutor during
Calhoun’s trial.40 Specifically, her statement addressed the prosecution’s
suggestion to jurors that they should fill in evidentiary gaps with assumptions
based on racial stereotypes.41 During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of
Calhoun, Calhoun explained that the night before the arrest, “he had detached
himself from the group when his friend arrived at their hotel room with a bag
of money.”42 Consistent with his defense, Calhoun testified that he “didn’t
know” what was happening, and that it “made [him] think . . . [t]hat [he]
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (mem.).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer, J., statement respecting denial for writ of certiorari).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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didn’t want to be there.”43 After Calhoun failed to answer the prosecution’s
questions about why he did not want to be in the hotel room, the prosecutor
then asked more pointedly: “You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of money. Does that tell you—a light bulb
doesn’t go off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?”44 Justice Sotomayor
described the prosecutor’s question as “pernicious in its attempt to substitute
racial stereotype for evidence, and racial prejudice for reason.”45
Justice Sotomayor’s remarks were noted for her strong rejection of the
prosecutor’s explicit use of racial bias.46 Observers would be remiss, however, if they were to conclude that the race of the defendant probably would
not have played a role in the jurors’ assessment of the case absent the prosecutor’s comment. While the prosecutor’s explicit remarks are deeply troubling, the deeper concern of racial bias impacting the factfinders’ decisionmaking was not prompted only by the prosecutor’s statement. Even if
the race of the defendant was not explicitly mentioned aloud, it is likely that
negative stereotypes of black and Latino men as criminals—here, drug dealers—would have unconsciously influenced the jurors’ assessments.
As indicated above, studies by cognitive psychologists show that negative racial stereotypes associating African-American men with crime are
deeply rooted in American society.47 These pervasive stereotypes can lead
to unconscious associations between black males and criminality, and can
have a significant impact in the courtroom. Indeed, one study has shown that
African Americans are not afforded a true presumption of innocence, as factfinders tend to find criminality among African Americans where they would
not among others.48 Studies have suggested that the mere presence of an
African-American man can automatically trigger thoughts about stereotypes

43. Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 125–26 (Mar. 8, 2011)).
44. Id. (quoting Trial Transcript at 127 (Mar. 8, 2011)).
45. Id. at 1137.
46. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Sonia Sotomayor Slams Texas Prosecutor for Racial
Remark, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/25/nation/la-na-court-sotomayor-20130226.
47. See supra note 26.
48. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010) (discussing results showing “implicit associations between Black and Guilty,” and that these associations “predicted judgments of the probative value of evidence”).
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associated with members of his social group, such as criminality.49 Moreover, not raising the issue of race where bias is triggered can lead to more
biased decisionmaking than when race is acknowledged.50
To be clear, racial bias can lead an individual to interpret the behavior
of an African-American man differently than they would interpret the same
behavior of a white man. In fact, one study showed that racial bias can cause
individuals to interpret identical behavior differently based solely on the race
of the individual being observed.51 There, research subjects were asked to
observe two men engaged in a heated dialogue. During the exchange, one
man ultimately shoved the other. While all observers watched two men engage in this interaction, the researchers manipulated the race of the men being
shoved and doing the shoving. The results showed that while most observers
perceived a shove by an African-American male to be violent or aggressive,
the identical behavior by a white male was far more often perceived to be
playful.52
To understand how race influences an individual’s perceptions, judgments, and decisions, it is important to consider how people cognitively process what they hear and observe. To begin, it is important to know that new
experiences are understood by being placed into existing cognitive frames
derived from earlier experiences.53 These embedded knowledge structures
give meaning to experiences, shaping perceptions and ordering thinking.54

49. Eberhardt et al., supra note 26, at 876 (discussing contemporary social psychological research showing that the presence of social groups can activate concepts with which that person’s
social group has been associated).
50. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet PostRacial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2013).
51. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590
(1976); see also Richardson, supra note 25, at 276–77 (discussing the Duncan study).
52. Duncan, supra note 51, at 595. The study found that when both men were black, sixtynine percent thought the shove was violent, compared to thirteen percent when both men were white.
Id. When a black individual shoved a white man, seventy-five percent thought the shove was violent, compared to seventeen percent when the race of the individuals was reversed. Id.
53. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making:
An Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 263 (2009); see J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality,
and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING J. 53, 66 (2008) (“What ‘could’ happen is determined,
not by the decision makers’ undertaking an empirical assessment of actual events, but rather by their
looking to a store of background knowledge about these kinds of narratives—to a set of stock stories.” (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTINGING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 50 (1981)).
54. Berger, supra note 53 (“Because of the way the mind works and the culture is constructed,
metaphor and narrative are essential, and unavoidable, for persuasion and understanding.” (first
citing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 217–45 (2000); and then
citing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 128 (1999)).
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They allow individuals to plug new events “into slots in an existing framework” and to avoid “having to interpret and construct a diagram of inferences
and relationships for the first time.”55 As such, these embedded knowledge
structures provide both shortcuts and stereotypes, turning “new and unfamiliar situations into the normal and natural course of events.”56
While embedded knowledge structures play a central role in cognitive
processing, their function is not always appreciated by the thinker. People
are often unaware of the role that these constructs play in their understanding
of the world around them. As Professor Linda Berger has put it, “both information and understanding float beneath the surface, neither consciously acquired nor examined.”57 Thus, our conceptual cognitive processes can operate as a “hidden hand,” shaping “how we conceptualize all aspects of our
experience.”58
A number of cognitive frames have been discussed in social psychology
literature as embedded knowledge structures including categorizations, schemas, and stock stories.59 “Categorization” refers to the use of categories to
classify elements into groups; this term refers to where individuals place new
information.60 Categorization can lead to classifications of people based on
race.61 And, once a person is categorized into a group, other people then
apply “schema,” or generalized knowledge about the group to “draw inferences and derive predictions.”62 Thus, racial stereotypes are schema as they
organize “people’s expectations about other people who fall into certain social categories.”63
In judging a new event to determine what might have happened, individuals also look unconsciously to deeply embedded plotlines or dominant
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 263 (citing LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 9–15.)
58. Id. (quoting LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 128); see Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative,
Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 287 (2013) (“Paradigms exercise a ‘grip on the human imagination’ and therefore guide and influence the reception of evidence as well. They recur so frequently
in stories that familiar elements can enact them implicitly.” (footnote omitted) (quoting JEROME
BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 43 (1998)).
59. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1131–32 (2004) (noting that the dividing
line between categories, schemas, and similar concepts is somewhat ambiguous in the social psychology literature); see also Berger, supra note 53, at 264–69 (discussing the embedded knowledge
structures of metaphor and narrative).
60. Chen & Hansen, supra note 59, at 1132.
61. Id. at 1134 (discussing how schema, including “distinctions commonly made according to
race,” can impact categorization).
62. Id. at 1132 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELBY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 105 (1991)).
63. Id. at 1137 (describing role schemas that help organize knowledge about “the set of behaviors expected of a person in a particular social position” such as those acquired at birth (quoting
FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 119).
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stories, often referred to as stock stories.64 Without their being aware, these
stock stories can lead people to fill in factual gaps with a store of
knowledge.65 A stock story “resolves ambiguity and complements ‘given’
information with much ‘assumed’ information.”66 Thus, individuals may be
persuaded to believe a narrative about an ambiguous situation, not because it
necessarily reflects what happened, but because it corresponds to a familiar
stock story.67 As stock stories can involve characters who are categorized by
race and subject to corresponding stereotypes that shape people’s expectations, it would appear that certain stock stories are also associated with certain racial groups.68
If one considers the Calhoun case in this light, it is easy to see how
implicit racial bias likely played a role in jurors’ assessments of the evidence
in that case, regardless of whether the defendant’s race was explicitly mentioned. The racial identity of the defendant alone would prompt his categorization and trigger unconscious associations between African-American
men and criminality. Beyond this, the story told by the prosecution of an
African-American man participating in a drug deal might have rung a familiar bell with jurors who had heard this plotline—and others depicting African
Americans as criminals—many times before. Put plainly, as jurors heard the
prosecution’s story in Calhoun, they may have unconsciously referenced a
familiar stock story, and the image invoked in their mind might have involved
a similar scene with similar characters.

64. See Rideout, supra note 53, at 66 (discussing how in determining what happened in a new
circumstance, individuals can unconsciously make reference to “a store of background knowledge
about these kinds of narratives—to a set of stock stories”); Griffin, supra note 58, at 286, 297–98
(“‘Good lawyers,’ one . . . manual states, tie the circumstances of the case to ‘plotlines already
deeply embedded in listeners’ minds, to mythic narratives whose familiar moves reveal how the
world is and how people, faced with fateful choices, act for good or for ill.’” (quoting SAM
SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 7 (1999)).
65. Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 24 (2016) (citing Berger, supra
note 53, at 266) (“Storytelling is said to be central to our ability to make sense out of a series of
chronological events otherwise lacking in coherence and consistency . . . .”).
66. Anderson, supra note 65, at 24 (quoting Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 6 (1984)).
67. Rideout, supra note 53, at 66 (“The narrative is plausible, and persuasive, to the extent that
it bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock scripts or stories, not to the extent that it
‘really happened.’” (quoting Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analysis
of the First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005)); see also Anderson, supra
note 65, at 24; Griffin, supra note 58, at 297–98.
68. See Thompson, supra note 18, at 988 (discussing culturally embedded stories about groups
and stating that one story frequently applied to people of color is that they are prone to engage in
criminal and violent activity than whites); LEE ANNE BELL, STORYTELLING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE:
CONNECTING NARRATIVE AND THE ARTS IN ANTIRACIST TEACHING 29 (2010) (describing stock
stories as familiar stories that explain racial dynamics in ways that support the status quo).
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II. THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN POLICE
OFFICER PERCEPTION, JUDGMENT, AND DECISIONMAKING
As discussed above, implicit bias is unconscious and pervasive in our
society. As such, it can impact individuals at all levels of the criminal justice
system, including police officers.69 Indeed, the situations that police find
themselves in are ripe for implicit bias. For example, where police are actively seeking individuals who are engaged in criminal activity, this can “activate[] negative racial stereotypes that can affect the interpretation of ambiguous behaviors.”70 Moreover, police are often called upon to judge
ambiguous situations under stressful conditions, and make quick decisions
with limited information.71 In such circumstances, an individual will often
resort to referencing stereotypes, and implicit bias can play a role.72
In this Part, the author considers how embedded knowledge structures—
categorization, schema, and stock stories—operate in the background as police officers evaluate the suspiciousness of citizens’ behavior. Further, it considers how current legal standards not only ignore, but also mask, the potential influence of racial bias, thus diminishing the effectiveness of judicial
review. To begin, it is important to set the stage by describing the legal standards that courts apply to police stops.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth the
right of the people to security “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”73
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of this provision to
all citizens and the need for restrained law enforcement.74 Through its decisions, the Supreme Court has given meaning to the Fourth Amendment, setting forth the relevant legal standards that govern police encounters with private citizens.
69. Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1135–52 (discussing some of the crucial points in a criminal
case from police encounters to sentencing where implicit bias can influence decisionmaking).
70. Richardson, supra note 25, at 281 (citing Eberhardt et al., supra note 26, at 876).
71. Id. at 282 (citing Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342,
342 (2004)).
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . .” Id.
74. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968). In Terry, the Court declared:
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. . . .
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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In 1968, in the landmark case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held
that police officers could briefly detain private citizens that they deemed to
be suspicious on less than probable cause.75 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment would still apply in this context
and that “the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant.”76 In introducing a new
“reasonable suspicion” standard, the Court stated that the relevant test required balancing “the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search [or seizure] entails.”77
In framing the relevant legal standard, the Court decided “first to focus
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.”78 To justify a Terry police stop, it was determined that a police officer must have “a
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved
in criminal activity.”79 Indeed, police officers “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”80 The Court has allowed
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”81 However, a police officer is required to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”82
In Terry, the Court also discussed the need for judicial review, emphasizing the importance of judges’ “detached, neutral scrutiny” in evaluating
the reasonableness of specific circumstances.83 For judicial review, the Court
stated that it was “imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard.”84 The Court framed the relevant legal question as: “[W]ould the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”85
Prior to the Terry decision, concerns were already being raised about
the impact of police stop and frisk practices on minority communities.86

75. Id. at 24.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)).
78. Id. at 20–21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–35, 536–37).
79. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979); and then citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–83 (1975)).
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
81. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 21–22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
86. Renee Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to Limit Terry
Stops, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 883, 885 (2013); Thompson, supra note 18, at 957; see
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These concerns were barely addressed by the Supreme Court in Terry; there,
the Court dismissed the problem as one consisting of a few rogue police officers that the exclusionary rule was impotent to change.87 While the Court
in Terry gave little consideration to the racial dynamics of police stops, this
concern was later addressed by Justice Thurgood Marshall. In a 1989 decision, United States v. Sokolow,88 Justice Marshall remarked on the function
of the reasonable suspicion standard as a way to guard against stops that are
prompted on the basis of a defendant’s race:
By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such seizures, the Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected to “overbearing or harassing” police conduct carried
out solely on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals
look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics such
as race.89
The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Whren in 1996, however,
indicated that Fourth Amendment analysis was to be conducted without considerations of a police officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions.”90 While failing to
address racial profiling, the Court reiterated in that case that “circumstances,
viewed objectively,” must justify the police officer’s action.91
The following discussion considers whether the “objective facts” test
set forth in Terry adequately protects African-American citizens from police
stops based on racial bias. This discussion will consider the role that implicit
racial bias can play in a police officer’s assessment of a citizen’s behavior,
and the limitations of judicial review that, following Whren, denies that race
might even be relevant to such an assessment. This Part will also consider
how the relevant legal standards encourage courts to explain evidentiary gaps
with a generalized ideal of police expertise, rather than consider the possibility of racial bias. Lastly, it will consider the consequences of the Court’s
missed opportunities to address the influence of racial bias on police officers’
decisionmaking in police stops.

also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 363 n.133 (1998)
(“[The Commission] not[ed] that police departments, reacting to concerns about crime, have begun
aggressive patrol practices, including stop and frisk tactics, ‘without weighing their tension-creating
effects [for the Negro community] and the resulting relationship to civil disorder.’” (quoting
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 159–60 (1968))).
87. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13–14; Thompson, supra note 18, at 972.
88. 490 U.S. 1, 11–19 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15 & n.11).
90. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
91. Id. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978)).
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A. Stories Are Treated as Objective Fact
As Part I suggests, meaning is contextual. As such, one troubling aspect
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis is that it starts by considering the
“facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.”92 Indeed, the
Court’s confidence in police officers’ statements as a reliable starting point
for judicial review of police conduct rests on the faulty premise that bias does
not alter appreciably a police officer’s perception of what he is observing and
deems to be fact. To the contrary, “much of our knowledge is tacit and much
of our thinking is unconscious.”93 Embedded knowledge structures determine our “experience and expression”; they work without our awareness
shaping perceptions and reasoning processes.94 Put simply, one must consider whether a citizen’s observed behaviors make a police officer suspicious,
or whether suspicion colors the meaning that the police officer assigns to
what he observes.95
An illustration for this point—that some purported “facts” are subjective—can be found in Terry itself. In Terry, the police officer testified that
he believed that Terry and his companion, both African-American males,
who he had seen standing and moving about on the street, were “casing a job,
a stick-up.”96 There, the police officer based his suspicion that the men intended to rob a store on a combination of seemingly innocent behaviors. As
the Court observed: “There is nothing unusual in two men standing together
on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the street,
singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in.”97
In finding that the police officer was able “to point to specific and articulable facts” sufficient to justify the police stop, however, the Court did not
merely rely on a bland recitation of clearly observable facts drawn from the
police officer’s testimony.98 Rather, the Court repackaged these facts and
92. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
93. Berger, supra note 53, at 263; see also Griffin, supra note 58, at 287 (describing narrative
as “preconceptual,” with the power to “influence not just how facts are perceived but what facts
are”).
94. Berger, supra note 53, at 262–63.
95. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
“[r]eflexive reliance” on a drug courier profile “runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-bycase police work of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and detention”). In Sokolow, Justice Marshall stated that such a risk was enhanced by the profile’s “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)); Kang et al., supra note 24, at 1137 (discussing
studies by social scientists finding that police officers may “have an implicit association between
Blackness and weapons that could affect both their hunches and their visual attention”).
96. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
97. Id. at 22–23.
98. Id. at 21–23.
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organized them into a narrative. Utilizing this framework, the Court presented the police officer’s testimony in a manner that supported the police
officer’s assertion that the behavior of Terry and his companion, though they
were engaged in no activities that alone appeared to be unlawful, were nonetheless suspicious:
[T]he story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about
a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which
it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternatively along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where
each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in
one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and
where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple
of blocks away.99
Indeed, it is easy to see how a story makes a more compelling case for
reasonable suspicion than bare facts alone. However, the Court’s narrative
also reveals the malleable nature of the police officer’s statements, not to
mention the persuasive quality of the Court’s story. Indeed, one might question how imperfect facts couched in story, can ever be labeled as “objective
facts.”100 Stories are certainly told from a perspective, and the author controls
the meaning.101 In Terry, the Court fashioned the police officer’s testimony
into a familiar narrative with a clear theme.
Moreover, the police officer’s statements took on new significance in
the story as the Court selected words to describe the men’s behavior that carried subtly different meanings and some negative connotations. In the
Court’s retelling of the police officer’s story, the men who it first described
as being engaged in the act of “standing together” were later described as
“hover[ing],” not to mention that their “strolling” became “pac[ing],” and
their “look[ing]” became “star[ing].”102 Indeed, in the Terry opinion, while
the Court articulated the need for judicial review based on “objective facts,”

99. Id. at 23.
100. See Anderson, supra note 65, at 31–39 (comparing stories in judicial opinions that focus
on police officers’ perspectives with those that humanize the private citizen and tell the story from
the private citizens’ point of view; and noting the different choices made as to “language, point of
view, detail, and context”).
101. Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767,
772 (2006) (“Each character has needs and goals. The author controls how much the audience
knows about those needs and goals.”).
102. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 22–23.
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the Justices did not distinguish the clearly observable facts from the meaning
that the police officer—and later the Court itself—attached to them.103
B. Police Officers’ Logical Leaps Are Not Meaningfully Challenged
While it is troubling that courts may treat stories as “objective facts,” it
is equally concerning when courts fail to critically consider why police officers judge defendants’ seemingly innocent conduct to be indicative of criminal
activity. The opinion in Terry, for example, provides no evidence that the
Court ever received a satisfactory answer as to what it was about the particular men’s actions that led the police officer to judge their behavior as suspicious. Clearly, the police officer’s assessment was based on his brief, visual
observation of the men. While the opinion provides that the police officer
did not know the men he observed, however, the police officer was “unable
to say precisely what first drew his eye to them.”104 The officer also claimed
that when he looked over to them, the two men “didn’t look right” to him.105
Nonetheless, the Court considered the police officer’s assessments of suspicion to be sufficient given his police experience.106
In contrast to the Court in Terry, and many cases that have followed, in
his dissenting opinion in the relatively recent case, United States v. Mason,107
Judge Roger Gregory of the Fourth Circuit raised concerns about a police
officer’s inability to explain why he thought a defendant’s seemingly innocent actions were suspicious.108 In Mason, the court considered whether a
police officer was reasonable in his suspicion that the defendant, an AfricanAmerican man, was engaged in drug activity, justifying an extension of a
traffic stop.109 In that case, the majority acknowledged that “several of the
facts, when taken alone, were . . . consistent with innocent travel.”110 But,
similar to Terry, the court found that the facts, when taken as a whole, supported a finding of suspicion.111
In his dissent, Judge Gregory questioned both what the majority deemed
to be the “objective facts” in the case and the story put forth by the majority.112 To start, the dissent and the majority described the police officer’s
statements as to why Mason was suspicious in very different ways. Mason

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 21–22.
Id. at 5.
Id.; Thompson, supra note 18, at 966.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
628 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 136 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
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and his companion, both African-American men, were stopped on the interstate in Georgia, not too far from Atlanta, in a vehicle that had tinted windows.113 The dissent boiled down the relevant “objective facts” as follows:
(1) Mason’s one-to-two second delay in pulling over; (2) Mason’s
looking in the direction of his passenger; (3) the fact that there was
a strong smell of air freshener in the car; (4) the fact that Mason
was driving away from Atlanta; (5) the fact that there was only one
key in the ignition; and (6) the fact that there was no visible luggage in the backseat.114
While the dissent focused on observable facts, by contrast, the majority’s asserted facts were lengthy and offered in the form of a narrative.115 In
finding that the police officer had articulated facts supporting reasonable suspicion, the majority noted that context matters.116 But, there, the context appears to have been supplied mostly by the police officer.117 For example,
with respect to the single key on Mason’s key ring, relying on the police officer’s testimony, the court presented the following narrative:
[The officer] observed that there was only a single key on Mason’s
key ring. He concluded that this fact, combined with the fact that
the two men were coming from the direction of Atlanta, a city that,
according to [the officer], was ranked third in the nation in terms
of drug distribution, on a known drug route, could indicate that the
men might have been on a “turnaround” trip as drug couriers.118
A wide logical gap exists between the fact that Mason had a single key
in the ignition and the above narrative of drug activity. However, the majority did not question why the police officer concluded that the single key on

113. Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 128–29 (majority opinion); see Anderson, supra note 65, at 36–38 (providing an
example of a story told in a judicial opinion from the private citizen’s perspective without explanations for the police officer’s actions).
116. Mason, 628 F.3d at 129–30 (“[C]ontext matters: actions that may appear innocuous at a
certain time or in a certain place may very well serve as a harbinger of criminal activity under
different circumstances.” (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008))).
117. Anderson, supra note 65, at 38 (discussing context supplied by police officers that is included in judicial opinions, and rarely questioned, including that the area where an incident occurred
is a “high crime area” or “other general facts about suspected criminals that officers have learned
through ‘training and experience’”).
118. Mason, 628 F.3d at 129. The dissent included additional details of the police officer’s
assumptions based on Mason’s possession of a single key:
[The police officer] stated that [the single key in the ignition] suggested to him that the
car was borrowed. Because it was borrowed, he stated, there was no house key. “And
the reason there’s no house keys,” he stated, “is because there’s criminal activity being
pursued and no one wants to be linked to the car or criminal activity.”
Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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the key ring suggested that its particular possessor was a drug courier, or
whether something about the two men led the officer to attach such a meaning
to the key. Instead, the majority readily adopted the police officer’s narrative
of the meaning of the single key and other “facts,” while noting that several
of the “facts” presented by the police officer [alone] “could hardly have distinguished suspicious activity from innocent travel.”119 In finding reasonable
suspicion, the majority, without much further discussion, concluded that the
facts taken together would have given an “experienced officer a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”120
Judge Gregory, however, questioned the police officer’s significant
leaps in logic, stating that the police officer failed to articulate why any of
the observable facts “would be associated with criminal activity.”121 According to Judge Gregory, “[the police officer] provided ‘articulable’ facts, yet
provided no basis for why these factors were ‘suspicious’ individually or in
the aggregate.”122 Judge Gregory also noted that reasonable suspicion analysis should not change with the gender, race, or ethnicity of the motorists.123
To further his point, Judge Gregory provided an alternative narrative that incorporated what he had identified as the relevant “objective facts.” In that
narrative, the two African-American male motorists were replaced with a
mother and child:
While running errands with her child, a mother is pulled over on I20, just north of the Savannah River. It takes her one second to
pull over to the right-side emergency lane and while doing so, she
looks to the right, which also happens to be where her child is sitting. She has cherry-flavored air freshener hanging from her rearview mirror. She has one key in the ignition because her key, like
many keys on modern vehicles that also electronically lock and unlock car doors, is too big to fit on standard-issue key chains. And
she has no luggage in the backseat because, like most people travelling to the grocery store, she does not plan to spend the night.124
Judge Gregory noted that a police officer’s decision to then detain the
woman and child, in the example, and to investigate them for drug trafficking
“would be patently unreasonable.”125 The dissent’s hypothetical story suggests what courts often seem to ignore, that so-called “objective facts” are
not always what leads the police officer to be suspicious, so much as the
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 129 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 137 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Id. at 138 n.7.
Id.
Id.
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meaning given to the facts derived not just from the circumstances, but also
from assumptions made about the character of the defendant.126
In relying on the general, undefined concept of police officers’ “experience” to explain the logical leaps from making an observation to labeling it
suspicious, the court misses the opportunity to do what it aims to do: discern
whether the police officer had reasonable grounds for determining that a defendant’s behavior is suspicious. Indeed, the fact that a police officer may
have experience does not mean that the police officer is not relying on short
cuts, such as racial stereotypes or stock stories, to fill in the gaps.
C. Implicit Racial Bias Can Fill In the Gaps
While courts give deference to police officers’ experience to explain
logical gaps in their analysis, police are not immune from the influence of
racial bias. As discussed in the beginning of this Part, the nature of a police
officer’s job may even make them more vulnerable to reliance on stereotypes
and other cognitive shortcuts.127 Current laws and procedures, however, can
hinder the courts’ ability to identify implicit bias in police officers’ decisionmaking. Many legal standards allow little room for defendants to challenge police officers’ subjective perceptions and judgments which are labeled
as objective facts and treated as invulnerable to racial bias. This is the case
even where there are factual clues suggesting that racial bias may have impacted a police officer’s judgment. Indeed, in its opinion in Mason, the majority omitted facts suggesting that the police officer took notice of the defendant and his companion’s race as African American and associated the
men’s race with criminality.128 Notably, these facts were included in the dissent.129
For example, the police officer’s testimony in Mason suggests that Mason’s race may have drawn the police officer’s attention to him and shaped
the police officer’s perception of events.130 On cross-examination, the officer

126. See Anderson, supra note 65, at 25 n.30 (“Indeed, it is our lightning-quick tendency to fill
in the facts with a stock story that is responsible for much of the problems caused by implicit bias—
we fill in a (biased) story to fit a character we have learned is African-American or Hispanic.”);
López, supra note 66, at 15 (discussing police officers’ reliance on “the most easily generated information”); Richardson, supra note 25, at 272 (“Implicit bias can cause individuals to interpret
identical behaviors differently dependent solely upon the race of the individual observed.”).
127. See supra note 24–25 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Mason, 628 F.3d at 123–34 (majority opinion).
129. See generally id. at 134–40 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 135. Notably, similar clues that race may have played a role can be found in Terry.
Thompson, supra note 18, at 968 (“But, with race eliminated from the case, the most obvious explanation for McFadden’s suspicions and his subsequent actions was unavailable. The Court was
left with McFadden’s testimony that ‘he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to
them.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968))).
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testified that based on his “experience” he was suspicious of criminal activity
“as soon as he pulled over Mason’s car,” and agreed that his suspicion was
based on a “sort of gut instinct.”131 The officer’s testimony also demonstrates
that the officer noted the race of Mason and his companion—describing them
as “older black males, that [were] not in good shape”—in providing an explanation for why he needed a K-9 unit on the scene.132 The officer stated
that he did not feel that the men would challenge him physically, but he “felt
like if they had a gun, we were probably fixing to shoot it out.”133
At another point during the stop, the police officer indicated that Mason
failed to make eye contact with him and that he thought this was a sign of
criminality:
Mason was [n]ot making eye contact, shifting his weight. It’s hard
to explain in the sense that if you’ve ever looked into the eyes of a
person that’s looking at the rest of their life in prison they have a
certain look about them. And fear is hard to explain in that sense.
But when you are looking at a person that is fearful it’s just a different look that every officer that I know understands.134
It is worth noting that the evidence in that case, however, suggested that
the police officer was not accurate in his reporting of even Mason’s observable behavior. According to the dissent, a video recording of the stop showed
just the opposite of what the police officer indicated—Mason tried to make
eye contact while the officer looked away.135 Nonetheless, the police officer
shared both his inaccurate observation and the above narrative to describe
why Mason appeared to him to be suspicious, and this did not deter the majority from finding legal justification for the police stop.136
To address implicit bias, courts must be willing to take a more critical
look at whether race, rather than experience, may be the reason that a police
officer has made the leap from an observation of a defendant’s engagement
in an innocent activity, to a narrative of suspicion. Courts have too often
allowed testimony of a few innocent behaviors and lots of stories, to justify
reasonable suspicion.137

131. Mason, 628 F.3d at 134–35 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 135.
133. Id. at 134–35 (“Regrettably, I must begin by supplementing and clarifying some key facts
about Trooper Swicord’s detention of Mason that are omitted by the majority.”).
134. Id. at 135.
135. Id.
136. Similarly, the suppression hearing transcript in Terry provides clues of a racial dynamic in
that case that the Supreme Court’s opinion did not. Thompson, supra note 18, at 964.
137. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 669 (1994) (concluding that the evidence required for reasonable
suspicion “has shifted, slowly but inexorably, to the point that a few innocent activities grouped
together, or even no suspicious activities at all, can be enough”). While beyond the scope of this
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III. CONCLUSION
To justify a police stop, police officers must be able to point to “specific
and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences,” to justify
reasonable suspicion.138 Police officers are not to rely on a mere “hunch.”139
Implicit bias, however, can impact a police officer’s judgment as to what is
suspicious behavior. Racial stereotypes can work unconsciously in the background, shaping the officer’s perception. Stock stories can play a role,
providing a familiar narrative structure, and filling evidentiary gaps with assumed knowledge.
To effectively review police conduct, courts need to be able to critically
assess police officers’ factual assertions, seek explanations for police officers’ logical leaps, and consider the relevance of race. But, to do so, courts
need to be aware of the embedded knowledge structures that are working
behind the scenes, and to be able to “unpack” them. 140 For example, concerning the police officer’s testimony in Mason, it would be important for a
court to consider the pull of the stock story of black men as criminals that
may have been at work in the police officer’s subconscious. Indeed, a court
should consider critically the strength of the evidence as it hears a police officer testify that a defendant seemed to be acting in a nervous manner, or even
that a single key on a key ring could reasonably signal drug activity. However, in addition to considering the strength of the evidence, courts might try
to find ways to separate the observable facts from the meaning that readily
attaches to them. Judges might consider alternative narratives that match the
police officer’s stated facts, or consider whether the police officer’s story
makes sense if you change the race of the defendant.
While they represent alternative narratives, stories of African-American
males’ police encounters told outside the courtroom have seemed to gain little traction inside the courtroom. Perhaps the tides are turning. In a recent
case, Commonwealth v. Warren,141 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court considered reported findings of racial profiling in Boston in its reasonable suspicion analysis of a case involving a black male defendant.142 In
Warren, the court concluded that “the finding that black males in Boston are
Essay, it is worth noting that in many reasonable suspicion cases the location in which the defendant
is stopped—often categorized as a “high crime area”—is not based on any specific behavior of the
defendant other than his being present, but is often weighed in reasonable suspicion analysis. Id. at
685–86. The loaded term “high crime area,” combined with a defendant’s racial status, would seem
to only invite bias into a court’s analysis.
138. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
139. Id. at 27.
140. Lee Anne Bell, The Story of the Storytelling Project: An Arts-Based Race and Social Justice Curriculum, 5 STORYTELLING, SELF, SOCIETY 107, 112 (2009).
141. 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).
142. Id. at 342.
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disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for [police] encounters suggests a
reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt.”143 The court
further instructed that “[g]iven this reality for black males in the city . . . , a
judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”144 In challenging long
held factual assumptions based on new information, the Massachusetts high
court’s decision drew notice for its deviation from the status quo.145
As the Massachusetts decision demonstrates, stories told outside the
courtroom can play an important role in uncovering implicit bias. Stock stories work to maintain the status quo, presenting a dominant narrative that
often goes unchallenged. But, counter-stories can help judges to develop a
more critical ear: “Underneath the stock stories are numerous, teeming stories
that talk back to the stock stories, that challenge them, that speak otherwise.”146 Indeed, “[g]iven their special vantage point, concealed stories can
teach us much about stock stories.”147 Juxtaposed to stock stories, counterstories can work to dismantle stock stories as truth and instead make them
“just another story among many.”148
To address implicit bias at a more fundamental level, it is important that
courts move beyond the mislabeling of ambiguous evidence as “objective
facts,” and the myth of police officers as infallible experts who are not vulnerable to the influence of racial bias. Most importantly, courts must recognize the legal relevance of conversations about race in Fourth Amendment
analysis, and its necessity for meaningful judicial review.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. John R. Ellement & Jan Ransom, Black Men Have a Reason to Flee Police, Mass. High
GLOBE
(Sept.
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2016),
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Rules,
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tonglobe.com/metro/2016/09/20/sjc-judges-must-consider-high-rate-fios-between-boston-policeand-men-color/0baqga4wecvXxsWZwSnNlI/story.html.
146. Bell, supra note 140, at 112.
147. Id. (Counter-stories are those of individuals who are on the “periphery and looking at the
center, of recognizing the things that can be seen from the margins that cannot be seen from the
center.”).
148. Id.

